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Abstract 
 
How was it possible for public services to be liberalized in the EU despite a history of strong 
government control? Much of the literature on this issue has developed around the argument over the 
impact of EU institutions on the liberalization process. But the fact that liberalization is not an 
EU-only phenomenon poses problem: did EU institutions really matter? The paper tries to assess the 
relative impact of EU institutions and non-EU factors, especially the role of institutions at the 
sectoral level which has largely been ignored. Liberalization of public services involves the difficult 
task of dismantling an ancien régime which justified and supported monopolization, and of setting 
up a new one. Thus, it is highly likely that the vulnerability or strength of the former regime will 
affect the prospects of liberalization at the EU level.   
Against this backdrop, the paper focuses on “sector regimes” that governed service provision in 
each sector. Introducing the framework of sector regimes has several advantages. First, it allows us 
to trace and explain the agenda-setting process and preference change of member states in a dynamic 
way. Secondly, it helps us predict how likely member states' preferences are to converge. 
Thirdly, it allows us to see that the nature of relationship between member states and EU institutions 
is not a uniform one, but that it is in fact shaped by the vulnerability of sector regimes. The paper 
examines two cases, the liberalization of air transport and telecommunications services. The case 
studies show that liberalization of the two services was brought by the subsequent weakening of 
national sector regimes, and find that the impact of EU institutions was greater in the 
telecommunications sector than in the air transport sector due to the difference in vulnerability of the 
sector regimes. 
   2 
Introduction 
 
Provision of public services was one of the major socio-economic policies of West European 
governments in the twentieth century. The government provided a wide range of services such as 
water,  gas,  electricity,  post,  railway,  telecommunications,  and  air  transport  that  contributed  to 
people’s well-being, economic development, and the creation of employment. Since government 
intervention was legitimized by economic theories, that of natural monopoly in particular, there 
was  little  room  for  criticism  against  public  monopolies.  For  most  of  the  post-war  period, 
governments regarded the provision of basic services that are essential for citizens and economic 
activity as part of their responsibility. 
    However, the situation changed slowly but substantially from the mid 1980s, with the adoption 
of the White Paper on completing the internal market and the signing of the Single European Act. 
The  public  services  that  the  member  states  provided  became  targets  of  liberalization  at  the 
Community  level  one  after  another,  starting  with  air  transport,  and  quickly  spilled  over  to 
telecommunications,  electricity,  gas,  and  postal  services  in  the  1990s.  Many  of  the  service 
providers have been either fully or partly privatized, leaving less room for government control. 
How was it possible for a policy area which was subject to strong member state control to be 
liberalized in the European Union (EU)? 
    Much of the literature on this issue has developed around the argument over the impact of EU 
institutions on the liberalization process.
1  Among them, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet give the most 
“supranationalist” account, arguing that liberalization was driven by a coalition of the European 
Commission and transnational interest groups which pressured member states into changing their 
policy  towards  public  service  regulation.  During  the  liberalization  process,  the  Commission 
upheld judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Article 86(3) (ex Art. 90 (3) EEC) 
of the Treaty to press governments for liberalization. Thus, the supranational authority of EU 
institutions has been referred to as a major explanatory variable for public service liberalization in 
the EU.
2   
However, liberalization of public services did not occur exclusively in the EU, but in other 
advanced industrialized countries as well. This poses a serious question: if liberalization occurred 
in other countries, did EU institutions really matter?; were they decisive in bringing about change? 
For example, Schmidt insists that it was because of government support that the Commission was 
                                                   
1 See, for example, Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet eds., European Integration and Supranational 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Rainer Eising and Nicolas Jabko, ‘Moving Targets: National 
Interests and Electricity Liberalization in the European Union’ in Comparative Political Studies 34 (7) September 
(2001): 742-67; Mitchell P. Smith, States of Liberalization: Redefining the Public Sector in the Integrated Europe 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005); Joseph Goodman, Telecommunications Policy-Making in the 
European Union (Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2006). 
2 Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, op. cit.   3 
able to make use of its supranational authority.
3  Moreover, Levi-Faur argues that liberalization 
would have diffused to most member states even without the EU.
4 
Thus, the objective of the present paper is twofold: first, to answer why EU member states 
agreed to liberalize public services; and second, to assess the relative impact of EU institutions 
and other factors that are not derived exclusively from the EU. To achieve this, the paper focuses 
on the politico-economic structures and institutions at the sectoral level, or “sector regimes,” that 
managed and regulated service provision in each sector. Liberalization involves the difficult task 
of dismantling these ancien régimes that justified and supported monopolization, and of setting up 
new ones. Therefore, it is highly likely that the vulnerability or strength of the former regimes will 
affect the liberalization process. As the following argument will show, the framework of sector 
regimes allows us to trace and explain the agenda-setting process and the change in member-state 
preferences  in  a  dynamic  way.  Moreover,  it  enhances  our  understanding  of  the  relationship 
between member states and EU institutions. Specifically, when a sector regime is vulnerable, 
supranational institutions and actors are likely to play the role of a facilitator of negotiations at the 
Council  rather  than  to  shape  the  preferences  of  member-states  per  se,  since  member-state 
preferences will have already changed due to the breakdown of sector regimes which was caused 
by forces other than those derived from EU institutions. 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section one outlines the basic structure of “sector 
regimes” and the conditions that make a regime more vulnerable, thus inducing liberalization. In 
doing so, it identifies two distinct types of sector regimes: one that is based primarily on national 
institutions,  and  the  other  on  international  institutions.  The  latter  is  presumed  to  be  more 
vulnerable and thus, be liberalized with less impact from EU institutions. In sections two and three, 
the liberalization process of international air transport and telecommunications services in the EU 
will be analyzed. These two services were chosen as case studies because: (1) they represent the 
two different types of sector regimes; (2) they can be considered as “hard cases” that have been 
explained by “supranational” governance; and (3) they are less susceptible to the influence of 
previous liberalizations since they were the first to be liberalized. The article will analyze the 
liberalization process by focusing on the vulnerability of sector regimes, how it affected member 
states’ preferences, and its relations with EU institutions. The case studies that follow will analyze 
the policy-making process up to the most critical decisions made in each sector: the adoption of 
the First Package in 1987 for air transport services; and the Council’s decision to liberalize voice 
telephony in 1993 for telecommunications services. 
 
                                                   
3 Susanne Schmidt, ‘Commission activism: subsuming telecommunications and electricity under European 
competition law’ in Journal of European Public Policy 5 (1) March (1998): 169-84.   
4 David Levi-Faur, ‘On the “Net Impact” of Europeanization: The EU’s Telecoms and Electricity Regimes between 
the Global and the National’ in Comparative Political Studies 37 (1) February (2004): 3-29.     4 
Structure and Vulnerability of “Sector Regimes” 
 
A “sector regime” is a configuration of institutions and structures that governs the provision of 
services in a sector. In general, public service sector regimes are constituted of: (1) a logic that 
legitimizes  monopolization  of  a  service;  (2)  a  formal  institution  that  stipulates  or  enhances 
monopolization; and (3) interdependence among actors who benefit from monopolization.
5  The 
theory of natural monopoly played an important role as a legitimizing logic of monopolization and 
public  ownership  of  transport  services  and  utilities.  For  example,  air  transport  services  were 
exempted  from  the  application  of  anti-trust  law  because  it  was  deeply  related  with  national 
security concerns, and because it was regarded as a natural monopoly. Since the basic principles 
of the international air transport regime was drawn up before and after the Second World War, 
governments  were  reluctant  to  grant  each  other  free  traffic  rights  over  their  territories.  Also, 
despite  the  fact  that  air  transport  services  required  massive  amount  of  investment,  there  was 
limited demand in the wake of the post-war period. Thus, governments had to restrict competition 
so  as  to  make  air  transport  services  profitable.  The  same  logic  could  be  applied  to 
telecommunications  services.  Since  network  construction  required  an  enormous  amount  of 
investment, it was necessary for service operators to minimize their production costs by expanding 
their network as much as possible. The conventional wisdom was that there should be a single 
service operator so that services could be efficient, and be provided at the minimum price. The 
fact that services were limited to telegrams and voice telephony at the time reduced chances for 
competition  to  take  place,  and  this  strengthened  the  logic  for  monopolization.  As  a  result, 
international  and  national  institutions  were  set  up  to  authorize  monopoly  status  for  service 
operators or administrations which provided these services. 
    In  international  air  transport  services,  the  Convention  on  International  Civil  Aviation  and 
bilateral aviation agreements regulated the provision of services. These international agreements 
provided  for  state  sovereignty  over  the  airspace  above  their  territories,  equal  opportunity  to 
participate in international air transport services, and at times, measures to enhance equality of 
outcome  as  well.  The  bilateral  agreements  stipulated  terms  on  airfare,  the  number  of  flights, 
capacity sharing, and traffic rights so that contracting states would be able to share equal capacity 
of flights and reduce competition between national flag carriers. In principle, a single airfare was 
set for each route through negotiations among airline companies at the International Air Transport 
Association. Furthermore, the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation in 1919 
                                                   
5 Studies on the liberalization of public services often use the concept of rent-seeking coalitions. In developing the 
concept of “sector regimes,” I especially drew on the work of Hulsink. cf., Willem Hulsink, Privatisation and 
Liberalisation in the European Telecommunications: Comparing Britain, the Netherlands and France (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1999).See, also, Yuko Suda, The Politics of Globalization in Telecommunications: “External 
Pressure” on Japanese Policies (Tsushin Gurobaruka no Seijigaku: “Gaiatsu” to Nihon no Denki-tsushin Seisaku) 
(Tokyo: Yushindo-kobunsha, 2005): 46-9.     5 
authorized national governments to restrict domestic air transport services (cabotage) to national 
airlines.  In  the  case  of  telecommunications,  the  International  Telecommunications  Union  set 
interconnection standards, and restricted the provision of international services to those operators 
who  had  monopoly  status  in  their  domestic  market.  Service  operators,  which  were  generally 
administrative bodies, were authorized by law to provide services and construct infrastructure 
exclusively.  In  addition,  they  could  decide  which  terminals  were  allowed  to  connect  to  the 
network,  set  standards  of  the  terminals,  as  well  as  prohibit  resale  of  networks  by  private 
companies.  In  this  way,  air  transport  and  telecommunications  services  were  exempted  from 
anti-trust law, and were governed instead by international and national institutions that formally 
excluded competition among service providers. 
    Actors who benefited from the legitimizing logic and formal institutions were public service 
providers, administrative bodies, hardware manufacturers and politicians. Public service providers 
and  administrations  profited  from  the  monopoly  over  service  provision,  and  possessed  the 
authority  to  regulate  the  market.  Hardware  manufacturers  were  able  to  benefit  from  a  less 
competitive  procurement  system  and  a  monopsony  with  a  demand  side  (i.e.,  usually  the 
government) which was less concerned with cost-effectiveness. Thus, politicians were able to gain 
support  of public  officials,  manufacturers  and  constituencies  in  rural  areas. This,  in  turn  was 
reflected in choices of government policies. The three elements noted above—logic, institution 
and interdependence among actors—formed a robust regime that supported the existence of public 
service monopolies. 
    Thus, it is possible to hypothesize that the weaker the sector regime becomes, the easier the 
liberalization process. But what makes a sector regime in one service weaker? Sector regimes lose 
their robustness when their legitimizing logic, for example the theory of natural monopoly, turns 
out to be less credible, and/or when actors who had benefited from the regime have to pay higher 
opportunity cost to maintain it. Also, regimes tend to be more vulnerable when they are based 
primarily on international institutions. This is because when two or more of the parties liberalize 
the sector, it enhances competition and brings down prices, thereby diverting demand to that 
country when there are no trade barriers. Public monopolies in neighboring countries will have to 
pay the cost of maintaining a regulated market by losing domestic users to foreign operators. In 
this way, liberalization in one country elevates opportunity cost for actors in another country to 
maintain monopoly, thereby enhancing the spillover of liberalization processes internationally. On 
the  other  hand,  liberalization  of  services  that  are  constituted  of  national  institutions  does  not 
generate  similar  spillover  effects,  and  liberalization  tends  to  stop  at  the  domestic  level.  This 
implies  that  member  state-preferences  are  likely  to  converge  in  sectors  with  regimes  based 
primarily on international institutions even without the impact of EU institutions. On the other 
hand,  member-state  preferences  are  likely  to  remain  diverged  in  sectors  with  regimes  based   6 
primarily on national institutions, and EU institutions are likely to play a more important role in 
the  liberalization  process.  The  following  sections  analyze  how  and  why  regimes  in  both  air 
transport and telecommunications services weakened, and led to liberalization. 
 
Liberalization of Air Transport Services 
 
Breakdown of the sector regime in the U.S. and its impact on the EC (1978-1984) 
    The regime that regulated air transport services began to weaken in the U.S., starting in the 
1970s.  As  was  mentioned  above,  it  was  the  lack  of  demand  and  economies  of  scale  that 
legitimized the regulation of air transport services. These problems were gradually resolved after 
demand started to grow in the 1950s, and transport cost decreased thanks to the development of jet 
airplanes. By the 1970s, it was deemed possible for small-scale, low-cost companies to survive in 
the market. In spite of these developments, major airline companies struggled for stable revenue, 
asking the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) for tighter regulation.
6  This went completely against 
the deregulation argument which was gaining ground at the time, and contrary to the hopes of the 
major airlines, only worked to speed up the breakdown of the existing regime. 
    Calls for tighter regulation from airline companies were refuted by the theory of contested 
markets which was recently introduced in the field of economics.
7  According to this new theory, 
if entry to and exit from the market were relatively easy, new entrants would be able to challenge 
the monopoly with lower prices. Therefore, government regulation is no longer necessary even in 
sectors with characteristics of a natural monopoly. As the theory of natural monopoly was rejected 
in this way, interdependence among the actors that supported the existing regime began to loosen. 
President Carter enthusiastically supported deregulation, thinking that it would raise support from 
the public who were users of air transport. In October 1978, a law was passed that stipulated the 
deregulation of market access and airfares in domestic routes by 1982 and abolition of the CAB 
by 1984. 
    Developments in the U.S. greatly influenced the policy proposal of the Working Party on Air 
Transport which had just been set up under the Committee of Permanent Representatives a year 
before in 1977.
8  In May 1979 the European Commission issued a Memorandum (hereinafter, 
                                                   
6 Takao Akiyoshi, Transformation of Public Policy and Policy Science: Regulatory Reforms in the Air Transport 
Industry in Japan and the U.S. (Kokyo-seisaku no henyo to seisaku-kagaku: Nichibei kokuyuso-sangyo niokeru 
hutatsu no kisei-kaikaku) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2007): 82-4, 93. 
7 Ibid: 96-8. There are many counterarguments questioning the proposition that the air transport market is 
contestable. 
8 Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Air transport: a Community approach. Memorandum of the 
Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities. Supplement 5/79 (1979): 7-8. It is not clear why the working 
party was established, but according to an interview by O’Reilly, a Commission official has commented on the need 
to react to the ECJ judgment in 1974, which is considered to have opened prospects for liberalization in the air 
transport sector (Dolores O’Reilly and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The Liberalization and European Regulation of Air 
Transport,’ Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, op. cit.: 167).   7 
“First Memorandum”) which, referring to the air transport policy in the U.S., proposed new goals 
and policy measures for the Community.
9  The Commission claimed that monopoly of the sector 
for reasons of economies of scale “is not necessarily true,”
10  and that competition rules should be 
applied.
11  The  Commission’s  neoliberal  understanding  of  the  problem,  and  its  strong  will  to 
counter the ancien régime were reflected in the text. 
    However, the Council ignored most of the Commission’s proposals. Restricting the emission of 
nuisances and simplification of freight transport procedures were what concerned many member 
states at the time, and liberalization was a not a priority for most of them.
12  The fact that the 
Commission proposed revolutionary measures in order to provoke discussion
13  did not help the 
negotiation either. 
    Nevertheless, the Commission proceeded with the consultation procedure and was encouraged 
by  the  European  Parliament,  airline  companies  and  user  associations  who  supported 
liberalization.
14  This motivated the Commission to complete another Memorandum (hereinafter, 
“Second Memorandum”) in March 1984. The Second Memorandum was a more concrete, detailed 
policy proposal than the first, which recommended a gradual, partial liberalization. In response, 
the  Council  set  up  a  High  Level  Working  Group  constituted  of  national  flag  carriers  and 
regulatory agencies. The Working Group met eight times in late 1984, and submitted a report 
which showed changes in member states’ preferences toward liberalization. Member states who 
strongly  supported  the  Commission’s  proposal  were  representatives  from  the  U.K.,  the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, but the rest also agreed that a gradual, limited liberalization was 
necessary.
15  The fact the all member states agreed to examine the prospects of liberalization, 
albeit cautiously, was a significant change, which reflected the weakening of the air transport 
sector regime in these states. 
 
Breakdown of the sector regime in Europe (1978-1985) 
The Netherlands was the first member state in the Community to conclude a liberal bilateral 
agreement with the U.S. The Netherlands supported the U.S. at the Chicago Conference in 1944 
and had traditionally supported a liberal air transport regime. Its national flag carrier, KLM, was 
known for its efficient management which concentrated on international services, and was seeking 
to gain greater access to the U.S. market. In order to support KLM, the Dutch government not 
                                                   
9 CEC, op. cit.: 28-30. 
10 Ibid.: 13. 
11 Ibid.: 19. 
12 Ibid.: 24. 
13 Ibid.: 3. 
14 CEC, Civil Aviation Memorandum No 2. Progress Towards the Development of a Community Air Transport Policy. 
COM (84) 72 final. Brussels: 15 march 1984: 3,7. 
15 Stephen Wheatcroft and Geoffrey Lipman, Air Transport in a Competitive European Market: Problems, Prospects 
and Strategies (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986): 54-5.   8 
only concluded a new bilateral agreement with the U.S., but was promoting a liberal plurilateral 
agreement  as  well.
16  The  U.S.-Dutch  agreement  in  1978  became  a  threat  for  neighboring 
countries that were still harboring protectionist agreements, and led the Belgian, West German and 
British governments to revise their bilateral agreements with the U.S. 
    Liberalization in the North Atlantic routes spilled over to European routes after 1984. This time, 
it was the U.K. who set the process in motion. Having completed the restructuring of British 
Airways, the Thatcher administration began to promote the revision of bilateral agreements with 
other EC member states. The first one was with the Dutch which was concluded in 1984. At the 
end of the same year, West Germany also responded to calls of the British. These developments 
led to a watershed year in 1985 when Luxembourg, France and Belgium also concluded new 
agreements with the U.K., thus creating a wave of liberalization in Western Europe.
17 
    What made such a spillover of liberal bilateral agreements possible? This was due to the market 
structure  of  the  air  transport  sector  which  enhanced  transport  diversion  from  countries  with 
protectionist regimes to those with liberal ones. For example, if transport capacity and airfares 
were  to  be  liberalized  through  a  liberal  bilateral  agreement  between  the  Dutch and  the U.S., 
national flag carriers will have to compete with each other, thus bringing down airfares in the 
Amsterdam-New York route. This may make it cheaper for users in neighboring countries such as 
West Germany or Belgium to travel via Amsterdam instead of flying from their own country to 
New York. Consequently, airline companies in these countries will lose customers to KLM.
18  The 
fact  that  European  airlines  had  a  greater  dependency  on  international  services
19  made  them 
extremely  vulnerable  to  the  threat  of  transport  diversion.
  20  In  fact,  between  1978  and  1981, 
countries  such  as  Belgium,  the  Netherlands  and  West  Germany  who  had  concluded  liberal 
bilateral regimes with the U.S. saw a rise in the number of passengers in the North Atlantic route 
by  30.9  percent,  while  in  countries  such  as  France,  Spain  and  Italy,  who  maintained  their 
protectionist agreements, the number increased by only 12 percent
21. In other words, in countries 
where  the  government  had  maintained  their  protectionist  regimes,  national  flag  carriers  were 
paying an enormous amount of opportunity cost. The same logic can be applied to explain the rise 
                                                   
16 Daniel M. Kasper, Deregulation and Globalization: Liberalizing International Trade in Air Services (Cambridge: 
Ballinger, 1988): 56-7. 
17 It is important to note that the French and Belgian decisions in fall 1985 to conclude a new agreement with the U.K. 
were made against the backdrop of the White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, which was adopted just a few 
months before, in June. 
18 Higher reduction of airfares and growth in passenger traffic were seen in early liberalizing countries. For example, 
leisure airfares between Amsterdam and the U.K. were reduced by 20%, and passenger traffic increased by 63% 
between 1982 and 1987, while airfares rose by 18% and passenger traffic increased only by 25% in routes connecting 
Paris and the U.K. (Kim Abbot and David Thompson, ‘De-regulating European aviation: The impact of bilateral 
liberalisation’ in International Journal of Industrial Organization 9 (1991): 131). 
19 Civil Aviation Authority, Airline Competition in the Single European Market (London: Civil Aviation Authority, 
1993): 75. 
20 Kasper, op. cit.: 78. 
21 Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez and Ivor P. Morgan, ‘Deregulating International Markets: The Examples of Aviation and 
Ocean Shipping’ in Yale Journal on Regulation 2 (1) (1984): 115.   9 
of liberal bilateral agreements in European routes.   
    In the bilateral agreements concluded between the U.K. and the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and 
Belgium, regulations on market access, transport capacity, and airfares were liberalized to a great 
degree, showing the governments’ strong preferences for a liberal air transport regime. On the 
other hand, agreements between the U.K. and West Germany and France were much more limited. 
For example, they maintained limits on capacity sharing: the former left room for consultation, 
and the latter set a sharing ratio of 55:45 instead of the previous 50:50.
22  By examining the 
content of the bilateral agreements noted above and policy stances of each country, it is possible to 
identify three groups of countries with different preferences.
  23  The first group includes the U.K., 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Ireland. This group supports rapid deregulation. The 
second includes West Germany, France, and Denmark. These countries prefer a gradual, partial 
reform of the sector and support the adoption of decisions made at the European Civil Aviation 
Conference by the Community. The rest, including Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece were less 
enthusiastic about regulatory reform. Considering the fact that the Council showed little interest in 
the First Memorandum, this shows that many member states had changed their preferences toward 
liberalization in just five to six years. At the same time, this indicates that the key to successful 
negotiation at the Council depended on how far the member states in the first group and those in 
the third group could compromise on the issue. 
 
The Single Market Project and the adoption of the First Package (1985-1987) 
As the sector regimes in many member states were beginning to weaken, the European Council 
adopted the White Paper on completing the internal market (hereafter, “White Paper”) in June 
1985. The White Paper stated that the Council of Ministers was supposed to decide on a common 
policy for bilateral air transport agreements according to the following schedule.
24  First, Council 
will decide on the procedure of setting airfares by December that year, then change the ratio of 
capacity sharing from 50:50 to 75:25 by June 1986, and finally, adopt a common policy regarding 
the application of Article 81 (ex Art. 85 EEC) by 1987. In addition, the White Paper noted that the 
Commission would use its powers designated in Article 85 (ex Art. 89 EEC) to examine violations 
of airline companies and demand member state governments to take the necessary measures if the 
Council did not show progress according to schedule.
25 
    However, negotiations in the Council did not proceed as scheduled. Instead, it was the judgment 
of the ECJ in April 1986 that gave an impulse to the negotiation process. The ECJ concluded that 
competition rules of the Treaty applied to bilateral agreements on air transport services, and until 
                                                   
22 Wheatcroft and Lipman, op. cit.: 213. 
23 Ibid.: 61. 
24 CEC, Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Milan, 28-29 
June 1985). COM (85) 310 final: 30, Annex: 27; CEC (1984). 
25 Ibid.: 30.   10 
the  application  procedures  are  decided  in  accordance  with  Article  83  (ex  Art.  87  EEC),  the 
member states or the Commission are to take the necessary measures according to Articles 84 (ex 
Art. 88 EEC)and 85 respectively.
26  Encouraged by the ECJ judgment, the Commission and the 
Dutch presidency decided to add pressure on the member states who were less enthusiastic about 
liberalization. 
    On June 18, the Commission held a press conference, calling on member states to respect the 
schedule stipulated in the White Paper and to take measures to liberalize airfares and capacity 
sharing at the Council meeting scheduled at the end of the month.
27  The Dutch presidency, who 
was also frustrated with the slow reaction of the Council, decided to make use of its status as 
presidency to refer to the problem at the coming European Council in the Hague. The Dutch 
presidency successfully included a paragraph in the Presidency Conclusion which referred to the 
ECJ  judgment  and  encouraged  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  adopt  the  appropriate  decisions 
“without delay.”
28  This turned out to be a turning point for the creation of a common air transport 
policy. A week later, the Council of Ministers set for itself a goal for the first time to complete the 
internal market by 1992.
29 
    For the Commission, though, the Council’s statement was insufficient since it did not guarantee 
the fulfillment of the schedule stated in the White Paper. Soon after the Council, the Commission 
notified the national flag carriers to correct or abandon all cartel-like measures that impede Article 
81 within two months, showing its adherence to the White Paper.
30 
    These developments coincided with the formation of a conservative government in France and 
the rotation of the presidency from the Netherlands to the U.K. that helped accelerate discussions 
in the Council after November. As was mentioned above, France had still maintained a cautious 
stance towards liberalization when she concluded a new agreement with the U.K. However, the 
conservative government formed in March 1986 was enthusiastic about liberalizing the economy, 
and at the Council in November, France began to propose deals so as to reach a compromise.
31 
The fact that the U.K. held the presidency helped the negotiation proceed as well, since the U.K. 
was now responsible for hammering out a compromise rather than demanding radical reforms. 
    As a result, most of the member states agreed on the terms of capacity sharing and multiple 
                                                   
26 European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court of 30 April 1986. Criminal proceedings against Lucas Asjes and 
others, Andrew Gray and others, Andrew Gray and others, Jacques maillot and others and Leo Ludwig and others. 
References for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de police de Paris France. Fixing of air tariffs. Applicability of the 
competition rules in the EEC Treaty. Joined cases 209 to 213/84 in European Court Reports (1986): 1425. 
27 Stephen Wheatcroft and Geoffrey Lipman, European Liberalisation and World Air Transport: Towards a 
Transnational Industry (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990): 60. 
28 European Council, Presidency Conclusions. 26 and 27 June 1986 in Bulletin of the European Parliament. Special 
Edition 4 July 1986: 5. 
29 Council of the European Communities General Secretariat, Continuation of the 1090th Council meeting Transport 
Luxembourg, 30 June 1986, 7883/86 (Presse 104): 8. 
30 Wheatcroft and Lipman (1986): 60. 
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designation at the Council meetings in November and December, thereby progressing towards the 
first stage of liberalization. Although the Council in December saw “significant progress”
32  on the 
terms of airfares, the policy stances of the member states mentioned above did not fully converge. 
Six countries, including the Netherlands and West Germany, agreed to the presidency’s proposal, 
but  four  countries  such  as  France  and  Southern  European  countries  demanded  conditions  on 
discount  fares.
33  The  confrontation  between  the  two  groups  reflected  the  differences  in 
geographic  conditions  and  the  competitiveness  of  their  national  flag  carriers.
34   Similar 
confrontation reappeared in issues such as fifth freedom and opening up of access to regional 
airports.
35 
    Despite such confrontation, it is highly likely that both the member states who preferred full 
liberalization and those who demanded tighter conditions held incentives for an agreement at the 
Community  level.  Countries  that  preferred  full  liberalization,  such  as  the  U.K.  and  the 
Netherlands, had better chances to open up Southern European markets by negotiating at the 
Community  level  rather  than  the  bilateral  level.  This  was  because  the  financial  status  of  the 
airlines of Southern European states were so unstable and fragile that it was deemed extremely 
difficult to open up their markets if the negotiations were left to bilateral ones. For the liberals, it 
was important that these countries were firmly set on the road towards full liberalization, even if it 
progressed in small steps. On the other hand, the Southern European states had to face increasing 
transport diversion if they were to be left behind in the liberalization process. Thus, it was also in 
the interest of these states to participate in the negotiations at the EC level, thereby slowing down 
the liberalization process. The countries’ strategic positions were reflected in the outcome of the 
First Package which was agreed in June 1987: i.e., the negotiation ended with the U.K. and the 
Netherlands compromising with the demands of the Southern European countries.
36 
    The  First  Package  functioned  as  a  spring  board  for  successive  legislations  to  liberalize  air 
transport services and led to the dismantlement of the monopolist regime which had governed 
international civil air transport. As soon as the second stage of liberalization began in late 1989, 
the  member  states  reaffirmed  their  commitment  to  complete  the  internal  market  by  January 
1993.
37  As a result, member states agreed to a greater degree of liberalization than the White 
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Paper had designated by July 1992, when the Third Package was adopted. With the liberalization 
of  cabotage  in April  1997,  the  problem  has  now  shifted  towards  slot  allocation  in  congested 
airports and agreements with third countries. 
    As O’Reilly and Stone Sweet have pointed out, the role played by the Commission in the 
liberalization process cannot be neglected
38. In the first half of the 1980s, the Commission drafted 
legislation and supported the creation of user associations despite the reluctance of a majority of 
member states. After the adoption of the White Paper, it used its legal powers enshrined in the 
Treaty  to  pressure  member  states  into  complying  with  the  schedule  and  influenced  the 
policy-making of member states, to a certain degree, by setting goals for further liberalization. 
    However, the analysis so far has also shown that the preferences of member states had changed 
substantially even before the Commission started to wield its legal powers, namely Article 86 (ex 
Art. 90 EEC), and that we need to look further into the process of preference formation. The 
reason why member states other than those of Southern Europe shifted their preferences towards 
liberalization,  albeit  difference  in  degree,  was  because  the  Dutch-British  bilateral  agreement 
spread  fear  of  transport  diversion  among  national  airlines  of  neighboring  states,  thereby 
weakening the sector regimes in these countries. As a result, the question that the Council faced 
after the adoption of the White Paper was not so much about liberalization per se, but about the 
appropriate  pace  and  extent  of  liberalization.  The  outcome  of  the  negotiation  was  up  to  the 
countries that demanded full liberalization and those that demanded the maintenance of regulation 
to compromise on an appropriate level of regulatory reform. In that sense, the fact that the U.K. 
held the presidency at the latter half of 1986 and was left in charge of reaching a compromise, and 
that a conservative government was formed in France were important coincidences. In these kinds 
of circumstances, the Commission did not so much shape the preferences of member states, but 
facilitated negotiations in the Council. The role of the Commission though, grew in importance in 
the telecommunications services, which will be analyzed with in the next section. 
 
Liberalization of Telecommunications Services 
 
Breakdown of national sector regimes and their impact on the EC 
As in the air transport sector, it was liberalization in the U.S. that triggered reform in the EC 
(European Communities). In the U.S., the consent decree of 1956 precluded AT&T from engaging 
in any business other than the provision of common carrier communications services. But the 
growth  of  the  computer  industry  from  the  1960s  led  to  the  development  of  new  specialized 
services and equipment for businesses by companies other than the AT&T. The 1970s saw the 
Federal Oversight Board and the court granting new entrants authority to provide specialized 
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services and allowing them to connect their terminals to AT&T’s network. Hence, it was not long 
before the monopoly status of AT&T was called into question. In November 1974, the Department 
of Justice filed an antitrust lawsuit against AT&T. After a hard-fought battle, the two sides reached 
a  settlement  in  1982,  in  which  AT&T  would  divest  itself  and  cease  to  provide  local 
telecommunications services, but be allowed to compete in the provision of value-added services 
(VAS) instead. 
    Following  developments  in  the  U.S.,  the  British  government  also  began  liberalizing 
telecommunications  services.  The  idea  to  liberalize  telecommunications  services  had  a  great 
potential to be welcomed by the financial sector which had long demanded for better services, and 
the public who had become weary of inefficient services and strikes of labor unions at British 
Telecom. 
    In this way, the provision of VAS, voice telephony, and infrastructure were liberalized in the 
U.S. and U.K. by the mid-1980s. But developments in the two countries did not simply spillover 
to their neighbors, as was seen in the case of air transport services. This was primarily because in 
the telecommunications sector, most of the services were directed toward domestic users, and 
users  were  unable  to  switch  providers  due  to  regulations  on  international  services.  The 
telecommunications sector was based on a regime that allowed a much smaller scope for the 
convergence of member state preferences than that of the air transport sector. 
    In the EC, Commissioner for Internal Market Etienne Davignon noticed the rapid development 
in  information  and  transmission  technologies  and  their  potential  impact  on  the  European 
socio-economy. Davignon was also familiar with the fact that new services such as electronic mail 
and videotext were being developed, and that they could bring down the cost of transmission. 
However,  this  knowledge  did  not  lead  to  the  proposal  for  the  liberalization  of  services  and 
infrastructure, but were directed towards the liberalization of the provision of hardware to enhance 
the development of technology. Hence, liberalization of telecommunications services was never 
proposed as a major agenda in the EC until the mid-1980s.
39  In fact, it was not so much initiative 
of the Commission, but developments in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that 
shaped the liberalization process in the EC. 
 
The Uruguay Round and the liberalization of VAS (1985-1990) 
In autumn 1982, the contracting states to the GATT agreed to examine a proposal to start 
negotiations on the liberalization of trade in services which was put forward by the U.S. The ever 
stronger integration of the computer and telecommunications industries enhanced the development 
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of  VAS,  which  in  turn  created  a  new  notion  of  trade:  “trade  in  services.”  Technological 
development in both industries led to the increase in international transactions, the emergence of 
multinational enterprises and outsourcing of business activities, thereby increasing the importance 
of  information  processing  via  international  networks.  It  was  therefore  deemed  inevitable  that 
liberalization of telecommunications services, especially VAS, which was highly internationalized 
and did not fit into the theory of natural monopoly, would be placed on the agenda. Behind the 
U.S. proposal were ambitions of the AT&T to enter into the international VAS market. 
    Although the U.S. was well aware of the potentials of liberalizing trade in services and its 
ramifications to the telecommunications sector, it was not the case for the Commission and the 
member states of the EC. Following the U.S. proposal, the Commission and several member states 
conducted a comprehensive review of the service sector for the first time. The report showed the 
link between trade in services and telecommunications, its potential growth, and the fact that the 
EC was one of the greatest exporters of services in the world. Among the member states, the U.K., 
France, West Germany, and the Netherlands were found to be the leading exporters.
40  In March 
1985, the Council decided to support negotiations for services trade under the GATT along with 
the U.S. The Uruguay Round negotiations began in 1986, and in parallel with the negotiations, the 
issue of service liberalization finally came to the fore in the EC. 
    In February 1988, the Commission presented an action plan to liberalize telecommunications 
services. The aim of the Commission was to swiftly liberalize the services market so that member 
states could decide on a common position for the new round and also to complete the creation of 
the internal market for telecommunications by the end of 1992. The Commission proposed two 
directives: (1) an Article 86 Directive to liberalize services that did not share the characteristics of 
a natural monopoly, that is, VAS; and (2) a Council Directive to ensure open interconnection 
between member states, i.e., the Open Network Provision (ONP). As no Article 86 Directive had 
ever been drafted before, the Commission’s stance caught the member states by surprise.
41   
    By the mid-1980s, VAS had been liberalized or its liberalization had been at least examined not 
only in Britain but also in France, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, and Italy. Since businesses 
were the primary users of VAS, liberalization was a convenient way for conservative governments 
to gain support from them. But only the governments in the U.K. and West Germany went so far 
as to support the liberalization of voice telephony.
42  Moreover, the rest of the member states had 
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not  even  considered  the  issue  of  liberalization  at  that  point.  Telecommunications  services  in 
Southern Europe were not sufficiently developed to adapt to the developments experienced in the 
U.K. or West Germany. For example, the number of access channels in Portugal was only half of 
that in Denmark (see Figure 1). This diversity among member states was bound to make the 
negotiations difficult, and the Article 86 Directive was a convenient way to circumvent delays in 
the liberalization process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Telecommunications Online Database. 
 
    In  December  1988,  the  Commission  announced  it  will  adopt  the  Article  86  Directive  to 
liberalize VAS. Since only the Council could adopt the ONP Directive, the Council responded by 
using  the  ONP  Directive  to  seek  concessions  on  the  terms  of  the  Services  Directive.  The 
preferences of member states clashed over the appropriate level of liberalization. While the U.K., 
the Netherlands, Denmark, and West Germany demanded full liberalization of VAS, France, who 
was accompanied by Southern European states and Luxembourg, wanted basic data transmission 
services to be exempted from liberalization. In this context, the Uruguay Round negotiations and 
the active trade policy of the U.S. enhanced decision-making in the Council. 
    Negotiations concerning the liberalization of telecommunications services started in June 1989 
at the Uruguay Round, and it was highly likely that VAS would be the first type of service to be 
liberalized. In addition, the U.S. expanded its target for liberalization beyond the domestic market 
from  1988,  demanding  the  EC  to  open  up  its  market.
43  Faced  with  mounting  international 
pressure, the member state representatives at the December 1989 Council recognized the need to 
decide on a common position and to liberalize the internal market. 
                                                                                                                                                      
public telecommunications network if it were to impede the development of private operators (Eberhard Witte, ‘A 
history of recent German telecommunications policy’ in Harvey M. Sapolsky et al., The telecommunications 
revolution: past, present, and future [London: Routledge, 1992]: 98-101). 
43 Woodrow and Sauvé, op. cit.: 110. 
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    As a result, the Council and the Commission agreed on a compromise to delay the liberalization 
of basic data transmission services until January 1993, to allow member states like the U.K. to 
proceed with early liberalization, while granting countries with low levels of development to defer 
the implementation of the directive. As has been discussed, many national telecommunications 
regimes were left relatively immune from liberalization in other countries because sector regimes 
lacked  the  spillover  mechanism  which  worked  through  the  market.  Instead,  the  Article  86 
Directive, which was legitimized by ECJ judgments in 1991 and 1992, and international pressures 
acted as a driving force for common policy. The “deux-vitesses (two-speed)” approach, which 
became common in subsequent directives, was a response to such exogenous pressure and the rift 
among member states preferences. 
 
The GATS negotiations and the liberalization of voice telephony (1990-1993) 
During  the  negotiations  of  the  Services  and  ONP  Directives,  member  states  and  the 
Commission were in agreement not to apply competition rules to voice telephony and construction 
and  operation  of  infrastructure  for  the  time  being.  However,  the  very  notion  of 
telecommunications  as  a  natural  monopoly  was  losing  ground  because  of  technological 
development  and  fundamental  reforms  in  the  U.S.,  U.K.,  and  Japan.  Furthermore,  the  U.S. 
proposed in December 1991 to liberalize long-distance basic telecommunications services in the 
Uruguay Round.
44  Met with fierce opposition from the EC and other countries, the U.S. backed 
down the proposal. But by that time, the EC had already agreed to include an article in the General 
Agreement  on  Services  in  Trade  (GATS)  that  promised  to  continue  negotiations  for  further 
liberalization in the future.
45  Faced with these developments, it seemed inevitable for member 
states, albeit reluctantly, to liberalize voice telephony and infrastructure in the near future.
46 
    The  fact  that  France  Télécom  (FT)  and  the  French  government  became  enthusiastic  about 
liberalization was another blow to the states of Southern Europe who were opposed to rapid 
liberalization. The FT had become a public enterprise with an independent accounting system in 
January 1991 and was developing joint ventures with Deutsche Telekom to provide international 
services.
47  The change in French preference reflected the development in technology. The various 
technological  developments  that  had  been  in  the  R&D  or  testing  stage  were  now  ready  for 
commercialization, and telecommunication services were shifting from fixed voice telephony to 
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mobile  telecommunications  and  from  single-function  networks  to  multi-function  networks. 
Mobile telecommunication services had been in service since the 1980s, but the adoption of a new 
standard,  Groupe  Spéciale  Mobile  (GSM),  showed  prospects  for  growth  of  a  European-wide 
market. As for the fixed network, an optic wire was laid down across the Atlantic in 1988, and the 
introduction of ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) by 1992 was agreed in the EC, raising 
expectations for an emerging market for international data services for multinational enterprises. 
Surrounded by such environmental change, the objective of France in the GATS negotiations was 
similar to that of the U.K. and other countries that preferred full liberalization: to gain access to 
American, Japanese, and Canadian markets even if that required opening up their home market.
48 
    Until then, countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg
49  were 
able to cooperate with the French to lessen the speed of liberalization. But with the French shifting 
her attitude, albeit less so than the British, it was evident that it would be much more difficult to 
impede liberalization. The new French government, formed in May 1995, had manifested for 
liberalization and privatization of the economy. This fueled enthusiasm within the FT for reform, 
and enhanced the negotiation process in the Council. 
    After the Denmark Shock in June 1992, the Commission acted less authoritatively, becoming 
more of a coordinator and mediator, and was more discreet about adopting Article 86 Directives.
50 
But the Commission’s discreetness was also due to the fact that a consensus towards liberalization 
in the medium term was formed through negotiations and consultation among the member states 
and public service operators. Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland have responded that they 
would agree to the Commission’s proposal for full market liberalization by 1998 if they were 
granted financial assistance from the Structural Fund to develop their networks,
51  which paved 
the way for concession. As a result, the June 1993 Council adopted a resolution that stated the 
member states’ commitment to liberalize voice telephony by 1998, while allowing countries with 
lower level of development and small networks to defer the process.
52 
    In this way, the liberalization process of telecommunications services was quite different from 
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that of air transport. Since telecommunications services were mainly directed towards the home 
market, and access to the network was restricted by regulation, liberalization policies tended to 
stop at the national level. In countries where telecommunications networks were developed and 
where  they  experienced  technological  development,  national  sector  regimes  weakened,  but 
independently. Denmark, West Germany, France, and the Netherlands are an example. But in   
Southern European countries with underdeveloped networks and countries like Luxembourg with 
extremely small national networks, national sector regimes were still prevalent. These structural 
differences created serious rifts within the EC, and often made it difficult to pass directives even 
by  qualified  majority  voting.  The  reason  why  the  Commission  was  able  to  employ  its 
supranational  authority  by  adopting  Article  86  Directives  was  because  there  was  consistent 
demand  for  accelerated  liberalization  by  some  member  states,
53  and  because  member  states 
recognized the need to adopt a common position for the GATS negotiations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In  order  to  understand  why  public  services  have  been  liberalized  in  the  EU,  the  paper 
investigated how the gradual weakening of national sector regimes led to the liberalization of air 
transport and telecommunications services at the EU level. Sector regimes of the two services 
weakened because of technological, theoretical, and economic development that made the former 
legitimizing  logic  obsolete  and  consequently  raised  the  opportunity  cost  for  key 
actors—incumbent service operators and politicians in particular—to maintain the regime.   
But the way liberalization took place in the EU was different according to the vulnerability of 
the sector regime. In the air transport sector, national sector regimes were based primarily on 
international  agreements  and  thus,  were  more  vulnerable  to  policy  developments  in  other 
countries.  When  the  Dutch  and  the  U.S.  governments  embarked  on  liberalization,  the  policy 
change spilled over to their neighbors and created a wave of liberalization. This was because the 
threat of transport diversion raised the opportunity cost for actors in neighboring countries to 
maintain the regime, thus making liberalization in the EU more attractive for both member states 
seeking  full  liberalization  and  those  feeling  more  reluctant.  Since  member-state  preferences 
converged in this way, EU institutions did not so much shape the preferences of member states per 
se, but functioned as a facilitator of negotiations at the Council.   
On the other hand, liberalization of telecommunications in the U.S. and U.K. did not weaken 
sector  regimes  in  other  countries  because  sector  regimes  were  based  primarily  on  national 
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institutions. This expanded the divergence in preferences especially between the more advanced 
and the less developed member states, hampering liberalization in the EU. In this context, there 
was increasing role to be played by EU institutions, but with differential impact on the member 
states. By the early 1990s, there emerged strong demand from several member states, mostly 
advanced countries, as well as strong international pressure at the GATS negotiations to speed up 
the liberalization process.  Member states seeking accelerated liberalization formed a coalition 
with the European Commission and employed EU institutions to press liberalization forward, 
despite the reluctance of member states mostly of Southern Europe. In this case, EU institutions 
are likely to have pressured the less developed member states into agreeing to liberalization in 
exchange for financial assistance to develop their telecommunications infrastructure. 
Thus, it is plausible to say that EU institutions had a stronger impact on the liberalization of 
telecommunications services than on air transport. This is because in the case of the latter, the 
vulnerability of the sector regime accounted for the convergence in member-state preferences. In 
this way, the paper has shown the relative impact of sector regimes and EU institutions on the 
liberalization of public services. 
In  conclusion,  the  framework  of  sector  regimes  allows  us  to  trace  and  explain  the 
agenda-setting process and preference change of member states in a  more dynamic  way, and 
enhances our  understanding  of  the  relations  between member  states  and  EU  institutions.  The 
present analysis opens up a prospect of creating typologies of various liberalization processes and 
relations  between  member  states  and  EU  institutions  that  can  be  tested  and  refined  through 
additional case studies of liberalization. 
 
 
 